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Philosophical pleasure canes in about as
many shapes and sizes as personal computers
do, but one of the keenest pleasures, at
least to my way of thinking, is having an
article or book actually convince an intelligent reader of an important truth (or at
least supposed truth) not previous1y believed.
That, however, is as rare as it is
satisfying, and anyone who thinks it his/her
due dreams, as Spinoza says, with his/her
eyes open. P,robably next best is to be taken
seriously and read carefully by SUcl1 an intelligent reader, but to be disagreed with
nonetheless.
And from Evelyn Pluhar, I am
happy to say--or happy enough to say--I have
been awarded not the brass ring but the tin
facsimile of same.

is constrained by laws of nature
and by particular empirical facts
of existence; e.g., there is not
enough protein in a given child's
diet for his/her brain to develop
properly [that is, for him/her to
develop
into a human
person].
There is little to nothing that
individual human beneficiaries or
victims can do about this, so far
as their own case is concerned.
[ 3 ] Chance occurrences, many of
them unforeseen, to which all HOlID
sapiens are subject, may well prevent a human fran beooming a person
(e.g., genetically linked retardation) or rob a person of his/her
personhood (e.g., senility).
Again, it is not within our power to
make ourselves invulnerable to such
contingencies, or, in most cases,
to foresee them with any great
accuracy, or to prevent them from
occurring.

I

In "Speciesism Not Justified," [l] Pluhar
takes issue with two of my basic points in
"In Defense of Speciesism" (2] and attacks
both on ~ny number of gro~ds.
She also
raises
several objections to
peripheral
points in the paper, but I will pass over
those here.
What I would like to do is to
orient the reader by sketching (by quoting)
the skeletal outline of the main argument of
"In Defense of Speciesism" and then to discuss Pluhar's charges. Here's the Sketch:

Hllll'afl non-persons, then, should
for although in the primary case it is
persons who are ascribed
basic
rights, equality of opportunity,
or, better, fairness, requires us
to ascribe basic rights to human
non-persons as well (p. 52).
[4]

be ascribed basic rights;

(1] The concepts of a human being
and a person are not related merely
empirically, and human persons can
and do identify with human nonpersons.
This
identification-which is not sympathy or compassion
but a recognition of oneself and
what one was (a fetus, a child) or
could be (brain-damaged, comatose,
retarded, etc. )--has metaI;hysical
or quasi-metaI;hysical underpinnings
[which are described earlier in "In
Defense of Speciesism" and will be
discussed below].
(2 ]

Such, in very brief forIn. is the main
outline of the argument.
My main thesis, to
be absolutely clear about the matter, is that
all members of a species generally character-
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spend no time behind bars.
A pape.r on speciesism is no place to discuss the re-identif ication principle, especially as the litera-·
ture on it is so vast.
And, secondly, I
thought the relation between it and. (Ip)
obvious.

ized by personhood have a right to life. For
all intents and purfDses, this amoW1ts to
"All human beings (taking the term in a purely biological sense) have a right to life."
Hence, on it alone, unsupplemented with other
principles, a human being who is not a person
is ascribed a right to life, while a psyd~o·lryJically indistinguishable member of another
species is not.
Species ism, as the tenrr is
usually used, is an appropriate label for
this fDsition, even if the term can, and
often does, cover more ground than the single
thesis in question.

Plul1ar doesn't. Her se=nd objection is
that she sees no relation between the two and
that
surely the "identity" referred to
by the [re-identification] principIe is not the same as the "identification" referred to in (IP).
In
the former case, we are speaking of
identity in the sense of "sameness;"· in the case of (IP), the
recognition ("identification") of
personhood is the issue (p. 123).

II

Pluhar writes that I "defend [my] proposal by making two appeals:
[one] to metaphysics (or' quasi-metaphysics' ) , [one] to
fairness" (p. 123).
But, as even the brief
outline of the argument quoted above shows,
there are at least four main stages (or "appeals") to it.
Not that Pluhar's oversight
lets me off tile hook.
Concentrating mainly
on [1] and [4], she finds plenty to object
to.

"Recognition" is really out of place here--no
such term occurs in (IP)--and "sameness" is a
red herring of another sort.
For the reidentification principle simply tells us that
t.nere is a criteriological relation between
human bodies and human persons over time. If
that is indeed so, if the track of a person
over time is conceptually tied up with, criteriologically related to, the track of a
hUffi:m body (that is, a human being) over
time, that must be because at any given time
the very existence of a person is conceptually tied up with, criteriologically related
to, the existence of a human body (that is, a
I don I t see how anyone could
human being).
hold to the re-identification principle without also holding to conceptually prior (IP).
For, to deny (IP) while holding fast to the
re-identification principle would be like
accepting the principl~s of calculus while
rejecting those of basic arithmetic. Identification, after all, is conceptually prior to
re-identification.

Concerning [1], I wrote that "personal
identity seems to be closely tied to [human]
bodily identity, with the latter seeming to
be either a necessary condition for the former, or criteriologically related to [it]" (p.
49).
Criterion, in this case, is (partly)
explained, following Shoemaker, in terms of
its being a necessary truth that human bodily
identity is evidence for personal identity.
I
note, however, that the principle just
announced really concerns re-identifying persons, not identifying them, and it is identifying persons which is of parallount imfDrtance as far as the ascription of basic rights
is concerned. But a related principle,
(IP) It's a necessary truth that
the statement "X is a live hunan
being" is good evidence for the
statement "X is a hlJIIBIl person,"

Third, says Pluhar,

is true, or at least plausible, I maintain,
and it is directly relevant to the ascription
of basic rights.
Pluhar's first batch of
charges--four, by my count--centers on what I
say here.

(IP) is quite implausible on the
face of it.
It is easy enough to
. imagine a world in which "X is a
live human being" is not good evidence for "X is a human person" (p.
123).

The first is that I don't defend (IP)
but simply say that it is "a near relative"
of the re-identification principle, which I
also don't defend but merely claim others do.
I plead guilty to both charges--but will

I suppose that what she has in mind here are
worlds in which all, or at least many, of the
hunan beings born in it are brain damaged, or
retarded, or suffer sane mental failing that
precludes personhood; or perhaps all or most
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lose their personhood early in life. Arguing
by inductive enumeration in such a· world,
Pluhar would say (I'm supposing), "x is a
live human being" does not inductively warrant "K is a human person."

Defense of Speciesism." It is there, she
thinks, not because I take it seriously in
and of itself and wish to use it to argue for
speciesism.
No, it is there only to get the
reader to empathize with human non-persons:

True enough, but not really to the
point.
For such considerations don't show
(IP) false; what they show is that in such
worlds countervailing empirical considera-

We are to imagine ourselves in· the
other's place.
• • "Identification" in this sense is really empathy • • • • "Identification" in this
sense is utterly different from
that of "identification" in (IP)
(p. 124).

tions obtain that prevent concluding "K is a
hum:ln person" straightaway; that is, the
evidential weight that (IP) speaks of is
simply overridden in individual cases in such
worlds, and the conclusion, "x is a human
person," w01.l1d be,
overall, unwarranted.
That's hardly surprising.
(IP) doesn't say
that it's a necessary truth that "X is a
human being" ::Ls a logically sufficient condition for "X is a human person," only that
it's a necessary truth that it's good evidence.
All ,inductive principles, even the
best of them, and even criteriological principles, may have to give way in particular
circumstances in the face of evidence to the
contrary.
The chief difference between noncriteriologicql and criteriological arguments
lies only in the claim to necessity.
With
criteria, in the sense in question, we

Thus, I am guilty, supposedly, not only of a
gross equivocation on "identification" but
also of holding "that we have no [very great]
ability to identify with [that is, empathize
with] non-human non-persons (p. 124)."
Adapting a remark of Kipling's here, I
can only say, "Not so, but far otherwise."
First, (IP) is there not to elicit some sort
of emPQ.thic response from the reader but to
show him/her, whatever his/her psychological
constitution, that human non-persons are in
the same metaphysical boat as human persons
are as far as personhood, the primary ground
for the ascription of. basic rights, is concerned; and, by implication of silence, if it
weren't explicitly noted in the paper (p. 53)
and suggested by its title, that no non-human
animals are our metaphysical fellow-travelers.
The paper is a defense of speciesism,
so principles that distinguish members of the
human species from members of others in a way
that has at least an indirect connection with
a rrorally important concept, such as basic
rights, would be what I was after.

know that [something] is evidence,
not by having observed correlations
and discovered empirical generalizations, but by understanding the
concept 0 [~, in this case]
and the meaning of statements about
the identity of 0's.[3]
Fourth, Pluhar says,

Secondly, I certainly know that many
people have no trouble empathizing with animals of all sorts of shapes, sizes, colors,
and textures. tJlany, I have no doubt, find it
far easier to emPQ.thize with dogs, cats,
birds, cows, seals, or whatever than with
hwrens. Great stuff, emPQ.thy, and best wishes to all who use it wisely and well.
But
empathy has nothing to do with my use of
"identify with." When I write that we identify with human non-persons in a way that we
don't with non-hwren non-persons and that
(IP) provides the grounds for this, all I
mean is that the comrron judgment "That could
be me" holds for all human beings, whether
persons or not, that it doesn't for non-h\JIT"ICU""l
non-persons, and that the judgment has solid
metaphysical or quasi-metaphysical backing,
namely (IP).
The person who makes such a

Suppose we accept (IP); what would
it show?
At best, it would show
that all live human beings are
presumptive persons. This presumption is obviously not sufficient
for the ascription of basic rights
to human non-persons (assuming,
as
Wreen does) that persons are the
primary possessors of basic rights
(pp. 123-4).
Again, I agree. But my agreement shows only
why the argument has four stages, not one.
III

Far worse than any of this, though, is
Pluhar's misunderstanding of what (IP) and my
surrounding discussion of it are doing in "In
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judgment could be inncx:::ent of all philosophy,
not aware of (IP) at all, and devoid of
empathy, for all that "identify with" requires.
Walter Weber, for example, a friend
of mine of a distinctly unemotional nature,
identifies with many human beings that have
no inner life or a radically diminished one-the brain damaged, congenitally retarded, or
permanently insane, tc cite three[4]--and
some of these human beings, lacking an inner
life as they do, c-.an't be (rationally) empathized with.
On the other hand,
I myself
empathize with all sorts of non-human nonpersons--genets, sloths, and kudu, for example.
My argument is Kantian, and even the
rnost unsympathetic--and here I explicitly add
"and most unempathic"--Puritan can and does
identify with human non-persons.
Pluhar's
remarks about psychological identification
and empathy are thus one and all beside the
point.
If I had been interested in empathy,
the term would have occurred in the article.
It doesn't, and its younger sibling, sympathy, is explicitly disowned.
So much for
older siblings, too.

a right to life on Wreen's view.
[But] I, for one, find this thoroughly counter-intuitive (pp. 1256).
Well, I needn't hold that such human nonpersons--or animals of selected sorts--don't
have a right to life, only that, if they do,
that wouldn I t be on the basis of the argument
of my paper.

Pluhar's second major offensive concerns
the fourth stage of the argument, the one
concerning justice.
She lodges three objections here.
First, she says,
More importantly, though, Pluhar here
challenges the claim that I have provided
sufficient justification for the principal
contention of the paper, i.e., that all human
beings have a right to life: and, en route to
this objection, she also challenges the claim
that as far as personhood is concerned, there
is little to nothing that individual human
beings can do, in their own case, to prevent
its loss or to aid its development.

Wreen has made a case for the ascription of basic riqht.s t? those
human non-persons whose condition
is no fault of their own. Although
[he] states that there is little or
nothing we can do to prevent the
loss of our personhood, this is
often not the case.
Consider the
victim of an unsuccessful suicide
attempt who is now conscious but
permanently,
severely brain damaged.
Or
the Hollywood
stunt performer who makes a career
out of dangerous stunts and loses
his or her personhood as a result.
• • [And] what about the individual who is too fond of fatty foods
and physical inactivity tc ward
against arteriosclerosis, becoming
senile as a result?
Or the motcrcyclist who refuses to wear a helmet?
Or the driver or passenger
who
doesn't wear a seat belt?
'l'hese human non-persons don't have
BETI'WEEN THE SPECIES

Both of these objections can be handled
together.
Consider the principle that all
persons have a right to life, a principle
Pluhar herself holds to and which, as she
notes, is "relatively uncontroversial" (p•
122).
Does someone who holds this principle
ipso facto hold that capital punishment is
immoral, or at least the violation of a right
to life, or that kilLing a life-threatening
attacker is the same, or ditto for killing a
combatant in a just war, and so forth?
'l'he
answer is, "No." The principle in question
is implicitly ceteris paribus, just as every
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other such moral principle is, personhood
principles (such as the one Pluhar holds)
included, and is properly understood as defeasible under certain conditions.
Just as
it's possible to hold that a murderer has
forfeited his/her right to life, so it is
possible to hold (consistent with the argument of "In Defense of Speciesism") that the
long-tenn drug addict (who was destroying
his/her cognitive faculties), the starvation
victim (who, now no longer a person, refused
food in protest of government activities),
the Russian roulette' player (who survives as
a non-person), the "ffi3.ngled" suicide victim,
and all of Pluhar's crowd have relinquished,
waived, or forfeited their right to life by
recklessly or negligently risking or by intentionally
or knowingly jeopardizing or
attacking
their personhood and/or
their
lives.
Sure, human persons can do something
about their personhood--most obviously, suicide itself is conceptually available to
anyone who 'has a relatively full-blooded

(though the objection was also answered in
"In Defense of Speciesism"), but also hoping,
and hoping with greater avidity, to evoke the
Big Picture and remind the reader of the
place of persons in the universe--that is, of
their inherently biological nature, vulnerability, limited power, empirical needs as
persons, developnent over time, and lack of
control over the contingent circumstances
surrounding their personhood.
Conceptually,
however, the appeal at the fourth stage of
the argument is simply to a principle of
justice.
There is, at base, no personifying
of anyone or anything except persons--and, in
a different sense, of human non-persons. [6]
Last,
still another objection which
Pluhar finds more powerful than I do:
my
argument is circular, she claims, for I invoke justice to ascribe h~~ non-persons
basic rights--basic rights being their due--but to invoke justice is itself to assume
that human non-persons have a basic right,
namely, the right to justice.
The argument
is thus circular or question-begging.[7]

concept of the self--and even (what is more
directly relevant to my argument) do something about their hurranity •
But I know as
much, [5] and these possibilities don't impugn
my speciesism principle any more than the
existence of murderers impugns Pluhar's personhood principle.

Not so.
The circle can be, and is,
broken i f we distinguish betWeen justice (or
fairness or equality) as a principle and
justice (or fairness or equality) as a right.
The latter is indeed a right, namely the
right to be treated justly, but it is not
invoked in my argument for speciesism. it is
equality as a principle--"all creatures in
the relevant (person-related) class are to be
treated fairly and equally in respect to
personhood generated rights--which is used in
the argument.
As principles
frequently
ground rights--e.g., age principles ground
driving rights--or ground their denial--e.g.,
incarceration principles ground the denial of
voting rights--the distinction between principles and rights is, without further argument to the contrary, available for use.

Second, Pluhar asks,
what sense does i t make to talk [as
I
do] about the unfairness or injustice of nature or the universe,
or about basic rights being accorded as restitution or compensation
for such injustice • • • or [about]
"a Supreme Court of Justice of the
Cosmos" (p. 126).
My response within the paper,

that such talk
(about the Cosmos) is merely metaphorical,
and used for its imagistic vivacity and linguistic convenience, she rejects--though I
see no reason why.
But she then goes on to
say that if such talk really is extirpable,
as I say it is, then I "need to show us how
to cast [the] argument in [just such a nonmetaphorical] way" (p. 126).

v
The attention to and concern with nonhuman anim3.ls found on a number of academic
fronts these days is all to the good and, in
the long run, will probably help effect
needed changes concerning at least some of
the ways we think about and behave toward
members of other species.
But worthy goals
are one thing, extreme and unwarranted means
to achieve them quite another.
One of these
means, and a decidedly popular one at the
present time, is to deny the importance, and
even the relevance, of species membership as

The showing in question is edSY enough,
though: just read "In Defense of Speciesism"
without the phrases in question--ar read this
paper as it stands.
I deliberately baited
the hook with talk about the Cosmos being
unjust and the universe according compensation, hoping to elicit an obvious objection

27

BEIWEEN THE SPECIES

to me correct.
Pluhar herself speaks of
empathizing with non-human animals who are in
pain, and that requires anthropomorphizing
such animals to at least some extent.
As
Wittgenstein taught us, the prilnaxy case for
the ascription of pain is the adult hwnan

far as ethical matters are concerned.
Racism, sexism, and speciesism, it's said that
they're all one and the same thing:
taking
mere biology to have ethical import.
It
sounds right, that slogan does. But in actuality, it ignores far too many imp:>rtant and
pervasive facts about ourselves and the world
we live in, facts which sculpt the main contours of our lives and concepts, ethical
concepts included, and provide the very p:>ssibilities for the realization of value and
disvalue in the world.
Whether a biological
difference makes for a valuational difference
and, if so, how it does depend on the nature
of the biological difference, the nature of
the world, and how and how intimately the
biological difference figures into the scheme
of values entire.
Only disembodied spirits
can ignore biology altogether.

being, and the same p:>int holds for all psychological or (intrinsic) moral ascriptions.
Anyone who ascribes rights or intrinsic moral
standing to animals, then, does so on the
basis of the model of an adult human being.
7. This is another of the
alluded to in note 5.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Ann Cottrell Free
Editor
Ani~als, Nature and Albert Sch~eitzer
The Albert Schweitzer Fellowshlp, The
Albert' Schweitzer Center, The Animal
Welfare Institute, and The Humane
Society of the United States, 1982
65p, chronology, sources, bibliography,
acknowledgements
$3.95 paper

Notes
1. Evelyn Pluhar, "Speciesism Not Justified, II Ethics ~ Animals 5 (1984), pp. 122-9.
Subsequent references are indicated in parentheses.
Page numbers will readily distinguish such references frem those pegged on
note 2.

David M. Guss
Editor
The Language of the Birds
San Francisco: North Point Press, 1985
323p, notes & sources
$14.50 paper

2. Michael 'Nreen, "In Defense of Speciesism," Ethics ~ Animals 5 (1984), pp. 4760.
Subsequent references are indicated in
parentheses.

Roberta Kalechofsky
Haggadah For the Liberated Lam?
Marblehead, MA: Micah Publicatlons,
1985
79p
$8.95 paper

3. Sydney Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and
Self-Identity (Ithaca:
Cornell University
Press, 1962), p. 4.

Elizabeth Atwood Lawrence
Hoofbeats and Society: StUdies of
Human-Horse Interactions
Bloomington: Indiana University Preoo,
1985
200p, index
$29.95

4. This, in fact, is part of the point
of the three cases I cite in "In Defense of
Speciesism" (pp. 49, 51, 53). I am not sure
that Pluhar quite understood this (p. 125).

Elizabeth Atwood Lawrence
Rodeo: An Anthropologist Looks At the
Wild and the Tame
The University of Chicago Press, 1982
271p, references, index
$9.95 paper

5. An earlier version of "In Defense of
Speciesism" included six objections to the
main argument (and my answers to them), but
these had to be eliminated due to space considerations.
One was the objection just
discussed.

Jean E. Pearson
Issue Editor
Whitman and the Earth (The Mickle
Stroet Revrew~
Rutgers, 19R5
135p, contributors
$3.50 paper

6. P1uhar implies that I say that all
proPJilents of basic rights speak of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Cosrros.
This
is inaccurate.
What I say is that all antispeciesists (or better, all anti-speciesists
who accord non-h\.llffiTl animals intrinsic moral
standing) use a term like compensation, restitution, or sane such metaphorically, that
is, in a derivative sense. That still seems
BEIWEEN THE SPECIES

objections

Jeff Poniewaz
Dolphin Leaping In the Milk~ Way
Berkeley: Homeward Press, 1 85
73p
$5.00 paper

28

